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Abstract
This paper compares the empirical t of a Taylor rule featuring constant
versus time-varying ination target by estimating a Generalized New Keyne-
sian model under positive trend ination while allowing for indeterminacy. The
estimation is conducted over two di¤erent periods covering the Great Ination
and the Great Moderation. We nd that the rule embedding time variation in
target ination turns out to be empirically superior and determinacy prevails
in both sample periods. Counterfactual simulations point toward both good
policyand good luckas drivers of the Great Moderation. We nd that bet-
ter monetary policy, both in terms of a more active response to ination gap
and a more anchored ination target, has resulted in the decline in ination
gap volatility and predictability. In contrast, the reduction in output growth
variability is mainly explained by reduced volatility of technology shocks.
1 Introduction
Post-World War II U.S. economy is generally characterized by two particular eras: the
Great Ination and the Great Moderation. There is strong evidence that the former
era is represented by highly volatile ination and output growth while there has been
a marked decline in macroeconomic volatility in the latter period (Blanchard and
Simon, 2001; McConnell and Perez Quiroz, 2000; and Stock and Watson, 2002). The
Great Moderation is also associated with changes in the predictability of ination.
For instance, Stock and Watson (2007) document that ination has become absolutely
easier, but relatively harder to forecast, in the Volcker-Greenspan era.1 What are the
JEL codes C11; C52; C62; E31; E32; E52; E58. Keywords: Monetary policy; Great
Ination; Great Moderation; Equilibrium Indeterminacy; Generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve;
Taylor rules; Time-varying ination target; Good policy; Good luck; Sequential Monte Carlo.
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1Forecasting ination has become absolutely easier because of its reduced volatility while pre-
dicting ination has become relatively harder due to its reduced persistence.
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reasons behind this shift from the Great Ination to the Great Moderation era?
The two main hypotheses put forth by the empirical literature are either good luck
or good policy. The good luck interpretation - a decline in the variance of the
exogenous shocks hitting the economy - has been supported by a number of authors
including Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), Smets
and Wouters (2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
On the other hand, the empirical plausibility of a link between good systematic
monetary policy and macroeconomic stability has been advocated by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006)
among several others. This literature suggests that dovish monetary policy may have
steered the economy into an indeterminate equilibrium during the 1970s resulting in
the Great Ination. However, these authors nd that a switch toward a more hawkish
policy since the early 1980s brought about a stable and determinate environment.
Importantly, these studies only consider a constant zero ination target. However,
the view of a constant ination target is disputed by many. Amongst them, Kozicki
and Tinsley (2005, 2009), Cogley and Sargent (2005a), Ireland (2007), Stock and
Watson (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Leigh (2008), Cogley, Primiceri and
Sargent (2010), Castelnuovo (2010), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), Bjornland,
Leitemo and Maih (2011), and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) nd evidence in
favor of a time-varying ination target.
Empirical investigations conducted so far have either looked at the plausibility
of a switch from indeterminacy to determinacy through the lens of a model featur-
ing constant target or allowed for time-varying target ination while restricting the
model to determinacy in isolation.2Unfortunately, the assumption of a constant ver-
sus time-varying target ination is not innocuous for both the determinacy properties
and the role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation. For instance, the parameter
estimate of the Taylor rules response to ination gap depends on whether the Fed
is responding to deviations from a constant target or time-varying target. This then
a¤ects the probability of being in a determinate or indeterminate regime. Further-
more, Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) and Castelnuovo (2010) suggest that a
better anchoring of the ination target is the single-most important factor behind the
U.S. ination dynamics.
This paper employs full-information likelihood-based Bayesian estimation tech-
niques to estimate a Generalized New Keynesian (GNK) model featuring both posi-
tive trend ination and time-varying target ination while allowing for indeterminacy.
The estimation is conducted over two di¤erent periods: the Great Ination, a sam-
2One exception is Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) who use a limited information single-
equation approach to estimate a Taylor rule with time-varying coe¢ cients which allow them to
extract a measure of trend ination and construct a time-series for the probability of determinacy
for the U.S. economy. However, (in-)determinacy is a property of a rational expectations system
that requires a full information estimation approach such that the parameter estimates of the Taylor
rule account for the endogeneity of its targeted variables. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011) estimate a constant term of the Taylor rule which contains not only the trend ination but
also the equilibrium real interest rate and the Feds targets for real GDP growth and the output
gap. Consequently, the level of trend ination is not separately indentied and hence they need to
make additional assumptions.
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ple ending in 1979:II, and the Great Moderation, a period beginning in 1984:I. In
contrast to the existing literature, we distinguish between trend ination and time-
varying target ination. Trend ination, a term coined by Ascari (2004), stands for
a strictly positive level of steady state ination around which to approximate rms
rst-order conditions in the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).
Allowing for positive trend ination is crucial as it a¤ects the determinacy proper-
ties of the model. Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009) show that trend ination makes
price-setting rms more forward-looking which attens the NKPC. As a result, the
ination rate becomes less sensitive to current economic conditions and hence mon-
etary authority should respond more strongly to ination to induce a reduction in
output that achieves a given change in ination thereby widening the indeterminacy
region. On the other hand, we assume target ination to be time-varying and fol-
low a persistent exogenous autoregressive process whose unconditional mean is equal
to trend ination. Following Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2005b), Primiceri
(2006), Sargent, Williams and Zha (2006), Ireland (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri and
Sargent (2010), time-varying target ination can be interpreted as the short-term
goal pursued by the Fed conditional on economic situation and its knowledge about
the ination-output volatility trade-o¤. In contrast, trend ination stands for the
Feds long-run target compatible with its long-run goals such as ination stability
and sustainable economic growth.
We estimate the model under the assumption of a constant ination target, that
is equal to trend ination, over the two di¤erent regions of the parameter space,
i.e. determinacy and indeterminacy., following the methodology proposed in Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004).3 This sets up a baseline scenario which lets us compare our
ndings to those in the existing literature. Next, we estimate the model featuring
a stochastic time-varying target ination, again allowing for indeterminacy. Our
ndings read as follows.
First, when considering the model with constant positive target ination, we can
neither rule in nor rule out indeterminacy before 1979 while determinacy unambigu-
ously prevails after 1982. This stands in contrast to Hirose, Kurozumi and Van
Zandwaghe (2017) who estimate a similar model allowing for positive constant trend
ination and nd that the U.S. economy was unambiguously in the indeterminacy
region of the parameter space before 1979 and there is a switch to determinacy af-
ter 1982. While these authors employ a model with rm-specic labour following
Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017), we use a model with homogenous labor fol-
lowing Ascari and Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) in our benchmark
specication. Moreover, when using rm-specic labor, we also nd that the pre-
Volcker period is unambiguously characterized by indeterminacy. Kurozumi and Van
Zandwaghe (2017) show that the model with rm-specic labor is more susceptible
to indeterminacy induced by high trend ination than the model with homogeneous
labor which explains the di¤erence.
Yet, the upshot completely di¤ers when we allow for a time-varying target in-
3This methodology has been used in previous studies, such as Benati and Surico (2009), Bhattarai,
Lee and Park (2012, 2016), Doko Tchatoka, Groshenny, Haque and Weder (2017) and Hirose (2007,
2008, 2013, 2014).
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ation ala Cogley and Sargent (2005a), Ireland (2007), Stock and Watson (2007),
Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) and Bjornland,
Leitemo and Maih (2011). When making this choice, the posterior probability of our
sample concentrates all of its mass in the determinacy region for both pre-1979 and
post-84 sample periods. This result suggests that the Federal Reserve policy, even
during the pre-Volcker period, has been prudent enough to generate a unique rational
expectations equilibrium. Given these opposing results, it is essential to compare the
empirical t of the model under constant vs. time-varying target ination. Using
posterior odds ratio to compare the two models, we then nd evidence in favor of the
model featuring time variation in the target ination for both the sample periods.
Having established the nding that time-varying target ination empirically out-
performs constant target ination, we then perform theoretical and counterfactual
simulations to disentangle the role played by good policy and good luck in ex-
plaining the Great Moderation. First and foremost, the estimated model is able to
qualitatively replicate the observed drop in ination gap and output growth volatility
and the drop in ination gap predictability. Second, counterfactual exercises suggest
that better monetary policy, both in terms of a stronger response to ination gap
and a better anchoring of the ination target, has dampened most of the uctua-
tions in ination gap and contributed to the decline in ination gap predictability. In
contrast, good policyalone fails to explain the reduced volatility of output growth
which is explained by a reduction in the volatility of technology shocks. Hence, both
good policyand good luckinterpretations are required to explain the joint decline
in the variability of real activity and ination over time.
Perhaps most closely related to our work are Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010),
Castelnuovo (2010), Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014), and Hirose, Kurozumi and
Van Zandwaghe (2017). Both Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) and Castelnuovo
(2010) estimate a New Keynesian model log-linearized around a zero-ination steady
state and perform counterfactual simulations to assess the role played by good policy
vs. good luck. We depart from them along the following dimensions. First, we
estimate a model log-linearized around a positive steady state ination as it has been
shown to substantially alter the NKPC relationship and therefore ination dynamics
and determinacy regions. Moreover, Ascari, Castelnuovo and Rossi (2011) and Hirose,
Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017) has shown that a model with positive steady
state ination ts better than its simple New Keynesian counterpart which is log-
linearized around zero ination steady state. Second, we compare the t of constant
vs. time-varying target while also allowing for indeterminacy. Finally, we employ the
Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm developed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014,
2015) while they employ Random-Walk Metropolis Hastings (RWMH) algorithm.
SMC algorithm has been shown to be better suited for multi-modal and irregular
posterior distributions than the widely used RWMH algorithm.
Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) estimate regime-switching policy rules fea-
turing time-varying target ination and compare it to a specication with xed target.
Like us, the authors nd support in favor of time variation in ination target. How-
ever, they employ a partial equilibrium single-equation approach with two monetary
regimes, active and passive. They characterize monetary policy during much of the
4
1970s as passive and identies a switch to an active regime soon after Paul Volckers
appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Using a partial equilibrium ap-
proach to characterize the likelihood of determinacy is not innocuous as Ascari and
Ropele (2007) show that allowing for positive trend ination in a structural model al-
ters the NKPC, widens the indeterminacy region and the Taylor principle is no longer
su¢ cient to guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Hence, what they
label as active could still imply multiple equilibria. In contrast, we employ full-
information likelihood-based structural estimation to estimate a GNK model allowing
for both positive steady state trend ination and time-varying target ination.
Finally, Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017) estimate a GNK model
very similar to ours but one that features constant target ination. They nd that
pre-Volcker is ostensibly characterized by indeterminacy while better systematic mon-
etary policy as well as changes in the level of trend ination resulted in a switch to
determinacy after 1982.4 In contrast, we estimate a similar model allowing for time-
varying target ination and document that it empirically ts better (or at least no
worse in the case of rm-specic labor) than a policy rule featuring constant target
and favors determinacy in both sample periods. Moreover, unlike them, we then
go on to conduct counterfactual simulations to understand the driver of the Great
Moderation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst one to test for
indeterminacy using a full-information structural approach while allowing for both
positive trend ination and time variation in the Feds target ination. The nd-
ing that even the pre-Volcker period could possibly be characterized by a unique
equilibrium is a novel result.5
2 Model
The estimation is based on a version of Ascari and Sbordones (2014) Generalized
New Keynesian model. The model consists of an intertemporal Euler equation ob-
tained from the households optimal choice of consumption and bond holdings, a
discrete-time staggered price-setting model of Calvo (1983) that features a positive
steady state trend ination, and a Taylor rule that characterizes monetary policy.
As discussed earlier, allowing for positive steady state ination is important for the
following reasons: (i) positive trend ination makes price-setting rms more forward-
looking which attens the NKPC and makes the ination rate less sensitive to current
4Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo (2017) corroborate these ndings as well as those in
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) by revisiting the relation between the sytematic component
of monetary policy, trend ination and determinacy by employing a medium-scale DSGE model.
However, due to the complexities arising from the medium-scale nature of their model, they stop
short by estimating the model over the period 1984:I - 2008:II focusing on determinacy alone.
5An exception is Orphanides (2004) who nds an active response to expected ination in a Taylor-
type rule estimated for the pre-1979 period, thereby claiming that self-fullling expectations cannot
be a source of macroeconomic instability during the Great Ination. However, Ascari and Ropele
(2007, 2009) show that an active response to ination does not guarante equilibrium determinacy
when allowing for positive trend ination. Moreover, Orphanides (2004) nding is based on a single-
equation framework, whereas we use full-information structural estimation (recall that indeterminacy
is the property of a system).
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economic conditions; (ii) it alters the determinacy properties of the model; and (iii)
trend ination generates more endogenous persistence of ination and output even
in the determinacy case.6Unlike Ascari and Sbordone (2014), we assume stochastic
growth modelled as the technology level following a unit root process. We also re-
place their labor supply disturbance by a discount factor shock, dt, as our stand-in
for demand shocks and introduce external habit formation in consumption prefer-
ences to generate output persistence. In light of the result of Cogley and Sbordone
(2008) that there is no empirical support for intrinsic inertia in their GNK Phillips
curve, the model is estimated in the absence of rule-of-thumb price-setting. Also, our
Taylor rule involves responses to the output gap and the output growth instead of
log-deviations of output from the steady state. This then makes our setup similar
to Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2017). One important distinction of our
model is that we allow for time variation in the Federal Reserves ination target.7
2.1 The log-linearized model
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rt = rrt 1 + (1  r)

  (t   t ) +  xxt +  y (yt   yt 1 + gt)
	
+ r;t (5)
where    [1 + "(   1)(1  " 1)], #  (1  " 1)(1  ")=" 1,   (1 
" 1)(1  " 1)=" 1, and $  (1 )(1  " 1) and lower case letters denote
log-deviations from steady state. Here yt stands for detrended output, rt denotes the
6The plain-vanilla New Keynesian model features a poor internal propagation mechanism. As a
result the posterior mass might be biased toward the indeterminacy region. However, trend ination
generates more endogenous persistence of ination and output even under determinacy thus making
the indeterminacy test less susceptible to bias. See the discussion between Beyer and Farmer (2007)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
7Moreoever, following Ascari and Sbordone (2014), we assume homogenous labor whereas Hirose,
Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017) assume rm-specic labor.
8A full description of the model is delegated to the Appendix to conserve space.
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nominal interest rate, t symbolizes ination, t represents the Federal Reserves time-
varying ination target,  t is an endogenous auxiliary variable, st denotes the resource
cost due to relative price dispersion and Et represents the expectations operator.
Eq. (1) is the dynamic IS relation reecting an Euler equation where h 2 [0; 1]
represents the degree of habit persistence and g stands for the steady state gross rate
of technological change which is also equal to the steady state gross rate of balanced
growth. Eq. (2) and (3) represents the generalized New Keynesian Phillips curve
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor,  2 [0; 1) is the fraction of rms
whose prices remain unchanged from previous period,  is the steady state gross
ination rate or trend ination, " > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, and ' is
the inverse elasticity of labour supply. Eq. (2) boils down to a standard NKPC
when trend ination is zero (i.e.  = 1) and that also implies  t = 0. Eq. (4)
is a recursive log-linearized expression for the price dispersion measure under Calvo
pricing mechanism. Eq. (5) represents monetary policy, i.e. a Taylor-type rule in
which  ;  x;  y;r are chosen by the central bank and echo its responsiveness to
ination gap, the output gap, the output growth rate and the degree of inertia in
interest rate setting. The term r;t is an exogenous transitory monetary policy shock
whose standard deviation is given by r. Under constant target ination, we assume
that the policy rules becomes
rt = rrt 1 + (1  r)

 t +  xxt +  y (yt   yt 1 + gt)
	
+ r;t; (6)
where the central banks target is equal to steady-state ination or trend ination
.
The other fundamental disturbances involve a preference shock dt, a non-stationary
technology shock gt, and target ination shock t . Each of these three shocks are
assumed to follow AR(1) processes:
dt = ddt 1 + d;t 0 < d < 1;




t 1 + ;t 0 <  < 1:
We denote by d , g and  the standard deviations of the innovations d;t, g;t
and ;t respectively.
To solve the model, we apply the method proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003). Let us denote by t the vector of one-step ahead expectation errors. Moreover,
dene %t as the vector of endogenous variables and "t as vector of fundamental shocks.
Then, the linear rational expectation system can be compactly written as
 0()%t =  1()%t 1 +	()"t +()t (7)
where  0(),  1(), 	(), and () are appropriately dened coe¢ cient matrices. We
follow Sims(2002) solution algorithm that was revisited by Lubik and Schorfheide
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(2003). This has the advantage of being general and explicit in dealing with expec-
tation errors since it makes the solution suitable for solving and estimating models
which feature multiple equilibria. In particular, under indeterminacy t will be a lin-
ear function of the fundamental shocks and the purely extrinsic sunspot disturbances,
t. Hence, the full set of solutions to the LRE model entails
%t = ()%t 1 + "(; fM)"t + ()t (8)
where (), "(; fM) and ()9 are the coe¢ cient matrices.10 The sunspot shock
satises t  i:i:d:N(0; 2). Accordingly, indeterminacy can manifest itself in one
of two di¤erent ways: (i) pure extrinsic non-fundamental disturbances can a¤ect
model dynamics through endogenous expectation errors and (ii) the propagation of
fundamental shocks cannot be uniquely pinned down and the multiplicity of equilibria
a¤ecting this propagation mechanism is captured by the arbitrary matrix fM .
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) we replace fM withM()+M and in the
subsequent empirical analysis set the prior mean for M equal to zero. The particular
solution employed in their paper selects M() by using a least squares criterion to
minimize the behavior of the model under determinacy and indeterminacy by assum-
ing that it remains unchanged across the boundary. "Behavior" needs be described in
some meaningful way and we follow them by choosing M() such that the response
of the endogenous variables to fundamental shocks, @%t=@"
0
t, are continuous at the
boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy region. Analytical solu-
tion for the boundary in this model is unavailable and hence, following Justiniano
and Primiceri (2008) and Hirose (2014), we resort to a numerical procedure for the
model to nd the boundary by perturbing the parameter   in the monetary policy
rule.
3 Econometric strategy
3.1 Bayesian estimation with Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)
algorithm
We use Bayesian techniques for estimating the parameters of the model and test for
indeterminacy using posterior model probabilities. In our estimation, we employ the
Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) algorithm proposed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014,
2015) which is particularly suitable for irregular and non-elliptical posterior distri-
butions. Another practical advantage of using an importance sampling algorithm
like SMC is that the process does not require one to nd the mode of the posterior
distribution, a task that can prove to be di¢ cult particularly under indeterminacy.11
9Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) express this term as (;M), where M is an arbitrary matrix.
For identication purpose, they impose the normalization such that M = I.




11See also Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017) who are the rst ones to apply Bayesian
estimation using SMC algorithm to test for indeterminacy using Lubik and Schorfheides (2003,
2004) methodology.
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First priors are described by a density function of the form
p(SjS):
Here S 2 fD; Ig where D and I stand for determinacy and indeterminacy respec-
tively, S represents the parameter of the model S, p(:) stands for probability density
function. Next, the likelihood function describes the density of the observed data:
L(SjXT ; S)  p(XT jS; S)
where XT are the observations until period T . By using Bayes theorem we can
combine the prior density and the likelihood function to get the posterior density:
p(S; XT ; S) =
p(XT jS; S)p(SjS)
p(XT ; S)
where p(XT jS) is the marginal marginal density of the data conditional on the model





This paper employs the SMC algorithm of Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015)
to build a particle approximation of the posterior distribution through tempering the




[p(XT jS; S)]np(SjS)dS ;
where n is the tempering schedule that slowly increases from zero to one.
The algorithm generates weighted draws from the sequence of posteriors fn()gNn=1,
where N is the number of stages. At any stage, the posterior distribution is repre-







whereW in is the weight associated with 
i
n
and N denotes the number of particles. The algorithm has three main steps. First, in
the correction step, the particles are re-weighted to reect the density in iteration n.
Next, in the selection step, any particle degeneracy is eliminated by resampling the
particles. Finally, in the mutation step, the particles are propagated forward using a
Markov transition kernel to adapt to the current bridge density.
Note that in the rst stage, i.e. when n = 1, 1 is zero. Hence, the prior density
serves as an e¢ cient proposal density for 1(). That is, the algorithm is initialized
by drawing the initial particles from the prior. Likewise, the idea is that the density
of n() may be a good proposal density for n+1().
Number of particles, Number of stages, Tempering schedule The temper-






where  controls the shape of the tempering schedule. In our es-
timation, the tuning parameters N;N and  are xed ex ante. We use N = 10; 000
particles and N = 200 stages. Also,  , which is the parameter that controls the
tempering schedule, is set at 2 following Herbst and Schorfheide (2015).
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Resampling Resampling is necessary to avoid particle degeneracy. A rule-of-thumb
measure of this degeneracy, proposed by Herbst and Schorfheide (2014, 2015), is
given by the reciprocal of the uncentered variance of the particles and is called the





Mutation Finally, we use one step of a single-block RandomWalk Metropolis Hast-
ings (RWMH) algorithm to propagate the particles forward.
3.2 Data
To estimate the parameters of the model and test for indeterminacy, we employ three
U.S. quarterly time series: per capita real GDP growth rate, quarterly growth rate of
the GDP deator, and the Federal funds rate.12To compare the t of constant versus
time-varying target ination and to test for indeterminacy we estimate the model over
two sample periods. The rst, 1966 : I 1979 : II, corresponds to the Great Ination
period before the Volcker chairmanship. The second period, 1984 : I   2008 : II,
corresponds to the Great Moderation period characterized by dramatically milder
macroeconomic volatilities. The second sample ends before the onset of the zero lower
bound as the solution and estimation strategy is not designed to deal with it. The
measurement equation relating the relevant elements of %t to the three observables is






24 yt   yt 1 + gtt
rt
35
where g = 100(g   1),  = 100(   1) and r = 100(r   1).
3.3 Calibrated parameters
We calibrate a subset of the model parameters. We set the discount factor  to 0.99,
the steady-state markup at ten percent (i.e. " = 11), and the inverse of the labor-
supply elasticity to one. Following Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), we also
x the autoregressive parameter of the target ination shock  = 0:995; in order
to have a highly persistent autoregressive process.13 We estimate all the remaining
parameters.
12These variables are standard for estimating small-scale DSGE models. See, for instance, Cogley,
Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017).
13Alternatively, one may follow Ireland (2007) by assuming the target ination shock follows a
unit-root process. Instead, we calibrate it at  = 0:995 as Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010)
show that a unit-root target ination may counterfactually imply low ination gap predictability.
10
3.4 Prior distribution
The specication of the prior distribution is summarized in Table 1. The prior for the
ination coe¢ cient   follows a gamma distribution centered at 1:10 with a standard
deviation of 0:50 while the response coe¢ cient to output gap and output growth are
centered at 0:125 with standard deviation 0:10. We use Beta distribution with mean
0:50 for the smoothing coe¢ cient r, the Calvo probability  and habit h, and 0:70
for the persistence of the discount factor shock. The autoregressive parameter of the
TFP shock is centered at 0:40 since this process already includes a unit-root. The
priors for the quarterly steady state rates of output growth, ination and interest
rate denoted by g,  and r respectively are distributed around their averages over
the period 1966 : I   2008 : II.
For the shocks, the prior distributions for all but one follow an inverse-gamma dis-
tribution with mean 0:50 and standard deviation 0:20. The exception is the standard
deviation of the innovation to the ination target which is an important parameter
in our analysis. Following Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) we adopt a weakly
informative uniform prior on (0; 0:15).
Finally, we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) by having the coe¢ cient of the
vector M follow standard normal distributions. Hence, the prior is centered around
the baseline solution of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) The choice of the prior leads
to a prior predictive probability of determinacy of 0:498, which is quite even and
suggests no prior bias toward either determinacy or indeterminacy.
4 Estimation results
This section presents the empirical analysis. First, our ndings in terms of model
comparison are documented. Next, we discuss the parameter estimates, the estimated
ination target and the forecast error variance decomposition.
4.1 Model comparison
This subsection begins by comparing the empirical performance of the model with
constant vs. time-varying target ination. Table 2 collects our results. To assess
the quality of the models t to the data we use log marginal data densities and the
posterior model probabilities for both parametric regions. The SMC algorithm-based












where ewin is the incremental weight dened by
ewin = [p(Xjin 1; S)]n n 1 :
Following a vast literature initiated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and stud-
ied further by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) among
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others, we begin by assuming constant positive target ination. Our estimation im-
plies that the evidence for (in-)determinacy for pre-Volcker is mixed while determi-
nacy prevails after 1984. Phrased alternatively, we cannot dismiss the possibility
of indeterminacy in the rst sub-sample. Indeed, when assuming rm-specic labor
instead of homogenous labor as in Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017),
pre-Volcker is unambiguously characterized by indeterminacy (as shown in a later
section).
However, the view of a constant ination target is disputed by many. Amongst
them, Kozicki and Tinsley (2005, 2009), Cogley and Sargent (2005a), Ireland (2007),
Stock and Watson (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Leigh (2008), Cogley, Prim-
iceri and Sargent (2010), Castelnuovo (2010), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011),
Bjornland, Leitemo and Maih (2011) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) nd
evidence in favor of a time-varying ination target. Hence, following this literature,
next we allow for time variation in the ination target pursued by the Fed and the
results are drastically di¤erent. Both pre-Volcker and post-84 sample periods can os-
tensibly be characterized by determinacy as the posterior concentrates all of its mass
in the determinacy region. This nding suggests that the Federal Reserve policy, even
during the Great Ination period, was sensible and did not open the door for any
self-fullling uctuations.
Given such opposing ndings with regard to constant vs. time-varying target, it
is necessary to compare the t of the two specications. In terms of posterior odds
ratio, the marginal likelihood points toward the empirical superiority of the model
taking time variation in target ination into account. The Bayes factor involving
constant target and time-varying target reads about 25 for pre-Volcker and about 10
for post-84 sample periods. This suggests a "positive" evidence in favor of the model
where the Fed follows a time-varying target.14
4.2 Parameter estimates
Table 3 reports the posterior estimates of the parameters under time-varying target
ination. As seen in the table, the policy parameters have changed substantially
between the two periods. In line with the ndings of Hirose, Kurozumi and Van
Zandwaghe (2017), the policy response to ination gap almost doubled, the policy
response to output growth increased by a factor of 3, and trend ination fell consid-
erably by a third. Moreover, like Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), we nd that
the innovation variance of the two shocks: ;t and r;t, have declined quite notably.
According to our estimates, the innovation variance fell by about 50 percent, from
0:08 to 0:04 for the target ination shock, and from 0:36 to 0:19 for the policy-rate
shock. However, unlike Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) who nd a moderate
increase in the responsiveness to ination gap, we nd quite a substantial increase
across the two periods. This suggests that both the systematic response to ination
14According to Kass and Raftery (1995), a Bayes factor between 1 and 3 is "not worth more than
a bare mention", between 3 and 20 suggests a "positive" evidence in favor of one of the two models,
between 20 and 150 suggests a "strong" evidence against it, and larger than 150 "very strong"
evidence.
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gap and a better anchoring of ination target might have played a key role in the
decline in ination volatility and predictability after 1980.
Among the structural parameters, habit h and Calvo probability  do not change
across the two periods. This is of some comfort as these parameters are supposed to
be invariant to changes in monetary policy.15Among the non-policy shocks, there is
an increase in the persistence and volatility of the discount factor shock, a nding we
share with Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017). However, we nd a decline
in the volatility of technology shocks, a nding in line with Smets andWouters (2007).
4.3 Federal Reserves ination target
At this stage, we would rst like to assess the model-implied evolution of the Fed-
eral Reserves ination target. Recall that t is treated as a latent variable in our
likelihood-based estimation of the model. Here, we use Kalman smoother to obtain
ex-post estimates of t based on the observations that are included in the construction
of the likelihood function. As such this serves as an external validity check. Figure 1
plots the smoothed estimates of the (latent) target ination process on top of actual
annualized quarterly ination of the GDP deator. As seen in the gure, target in-
ation began rising in the mid-1960s and jumped up to 7% in the aftermath of the
1973 oil crisis. Subsequently, it dropped signicantly during the Volcker disination
and somewhat settled around 2:5% since the mid-1980s. The gure suggests that our
estimated ination target is similar to one proposed by Ireland (2007), Leigh (2008),
Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Auroba and Schorfheide (2011), Castelnuovo,
Greco and Raggi (2014).
4.4 Forecast error variance decomposition
In this section, we assess the role of the various shocks by appealing to forecast error
variance decomposition (FEVD) exercise. The FEVDs are constructed by computing
the contribution of each shock in explaining the forecast errors of the variables of
interest. Our computations, conditional on the estimated posterior means, refer to
several horizons ranging from 1-step ahead up to 1-step ahead to assess the contri-
bution of each shock at various business cycle frequencies as well as the unconditional
variances. Tables 4 and 5 report our results for the two sub-samples.
First of all, the results show that technology shocks play a dominant role in
explaining the uctuations in output growth for both the sample periods accounting
for over 90% of the uctuations across all forecast horizons. This stands in contrast
to Ireland (2004), who nds a secondary role for technology shocks and concludes
15Kurozumi (2016) shows that when the degree of price stickiness is endogenously determined in
the Calvo model, the probability of price adjustment rises with trend ination and this mitigates
the e¤ect of higher trend ination on the likelihood of indeterminacy. However, following Ascari and
Ropele (2007, 2009), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014), we assume
that price stickiness is exogenously determined. As such, one would expect the Calvo probability
to be a structural parameter that is invariant to policy changes. Incorporating endogenous price
stickiness into the existing empirical investigation is an interesting extension which we leave for
future research.
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that other shocks appear to be more important (or at least as important) than the
technology shock in the New Keynesian model. One key di¤erence between our
model and Irelands (2004) is that we log-linearize the model around a positive steady
state trend ination while Ireland (2004) assumes zero ination in the steady state.
This modeling assumption is not innocuous as Ascari and Sbordone (2014) show
that trend ination substantially a¤ects the propagation of technology shocks.16Our
nding resurrects the link between current generation of New Keynesian models and
the real-business cycle models from which they were originally derived.
Yet technology shocks play a negligible role in explaining the uctuations of the
nominal variables. Here we focus on both mean-based and target-based gap. Mean-
based ination gap is dened as the di¤erence between ination and the central
banks long-run ination target which is also the steady state ination in the model;
whereas target-based ination gap is the di¤erence between ination and the central
banks time-varying short run ination objective. Importantly, the target ination
shock plays a considerable role as regards the ination gap and policy rate, mainly
at medium to low frequency. This corroborates the results in Castelnuovo (2010)
who nds a similar role for ination target shocks. As pointed out by Castelnuovo
(2010), this nding is not necessarily a consequence of the calibration imposed on the
autoregressive parameter for target ination ( = 0:995) since the volatility of the
process, which is estimated, clearly matters as well. Moreover, while being relevant
for the unconditional FEVDs of mean-based ination gap (given its high persistence),
the role of such a calibration is less obvious for the FEVD of target-based gap even
at lower frequencies.
As regards the policy-rate shock and the preference shock, the contribution is
considerable in explaining the uctuations in ination gap and policy rate at shorter
horizons. For instance, the preference shock is most important in driving movements
in the nominal interest rate at higher frequencies.
Finally, it is also interesting to compare the di¤erences in the relevance of the
shocks across sub-samples. As mentioned above, technology shock is the key driver
of uctuations in output growth in both sample periods. While in the Great Ina-
tion era target ination shocks play a dominant role in explaining the uctuations of
target-based ination gap and the policy rate, however, when moving to the Great
Moderation sub-sample we nd notable di¤erence. The variance decompositions re-
veal that both preference and policy-rate shocks are important in explaining move-
ments in target-based ination gap even at longer horizons. Moreover, for policy rate
uctuations, preference shocks play a key role at all horizons.
Overall, the variance decomposition exercise suggests that the decline in the in-
novation variance of target ination shocks might have played a signicant role with
regard to the decline in ination gap volatility while technology shocks might have
been more important for the decline in output growth volatility.
16See Figure 13 in the published paper.
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5 Time-varying ination target: relation to the lit-
erature
How does our implicit ination target compare with the evidence in the literature?
Figure 2 compares our ination target estimate with a selection of other proposed
measures: Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), Ireland (2007), Leigh (2008), Cogley, Primiceri
and Sargent (2010), Auroba and Schorfheide (2011), and Castelnuovo, Greco and
Raggi (2014).17 Each panel plots GDP deator ination rate as well.
Several notable ndings arise. First of all, there is a striking di¤erence between
our estimated target and Kozicki and Tinsleys (2005). Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)
estimate a VAR model allowing for shifts in the ination target and imperfect pol-
icy credibility, dened by di¤erences between the perceived and the actual ination
target. The disparity between our estimate and theirs may be due to their imper-
fect credibility and learning mechanism whereby the private sector cannot perfectly
distinguish between permanent target shocks and transitory policy shocks.
As regards the estimates of Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), we nd that
the co-movement between the two series is very similar: with a correlation of 0:98
and 0:83 for pre-Volcker and post-1984 sub-sample respectively.18However, Figure
2.4 documents clear evidence of a gap between the two target ination series and
points to the essence of trend ination. While Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010)
leave the rst moment of observed ination unmodelled, the current paper overcomes
this shortcoming by explicitly modelling inations long-run value (by log-linearizing
around a positive steady state) on top of its dynamics.
Next, our implicit ination target is close to those of Ireland (2007)19, Auroba
and Schorfheide (2011) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014), particularly for
the pre-Volcker period for which the correlation reads 0:99, 0:98 and 0:96 respec-
tively.20However, our estimated target turns out to be much smoother and somewhat
di¤erent than theirs. In particular, since the early 2000s, there is a clear divergence
between the estimates. During this period, our estimate turns out to be higher than
the alternative measures as well as actual ination itself. This nding is intuitive and
captures the fear of deation among policymakers at that time which led to extra
easy monetary policy and lowering of the Federal Funds rate.21As noted by Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003), keeping interest rates too low for too long is equivalent to
a rise in the time-varying ination target.
17Sources: Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), Ireland (2007), Leigh (2008), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent
(2010) and Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) - original les provided by the authors; Auroba and
Schorfheide (2011) - American Economic Review (website), their paper, zip le under "Additional
Materials - Download Data Set", "ination-target.xls" le, "ltered f2 estimates".
18The numbers are conditional on overlapping periods, i.e. 1966:I - 1979:II for the rst sub-sample
and 1984:I - 2006:IV for the second sub-sample.
19Ireland (2007) studies di¤erent target ination processes, including some which allow for a
systematic reaction to structural shocks hitting the economy. Figure 2.2 plots the one labelled as
"Federal Reserves Target as Implied by the Constrained Model with an Exogenous Ination Target"
(see Figure 5, page 1869 in the published paper).
20The numbers again relate to mutually overlapping periods, in this case, 1966:I - 1979:II.
21See Bernanke (2002, 2010) and Bernanke and Reinhart (2004).
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Our estimates are also strikingly similar to Leigh (2008) who estimates the implicit
ination target using a time-varying parameter Taylor rule and the Kalman lter
focusing on post-1980 sample period alone.22 As in Leigh (2008, p. 2022-23), we can
divide our time-varying implicit ination target for the post-1984 sub-sample into
separate chunks: (i) the opportunistic approach to disination- a period covering
from mid-1980s to mid-1990s - during which according to Orphanides and Wilcox
(2002) the Fed did not take deliberate anti-ination action but rather waited for
external circumstances to deliver the desired reduction in ination; (ii) the low-
ination equilibrium in the late 1990s; and (iii) the deation scare in the early
2000s during which the ination target rose above actual ination.
Finally, as a note of caution, one must be careful when drawing these comparisons.
As Castelnuovo, Greco and Raggi (2014) point out, the di¤erences could be due to
di¤erences in investigated samples, data transformation, structure imposed on the
data and vintage of the data.
6 What explains the Great Moderation in the U.S.?
What are the reasons behind the decline in macroeconomic volatility and ination gap
predictability? In this section, we follow Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) and
Castelnuovo (2010) to conduct counterfactual exercises to disentangle the role played
by good policyand good luck. In comparison to these studies, our exercise is still
meaningful as we depart from them by estimating a model log-linearized around a
positive steady state ination rate. This has been shown by Ascari and Ropele (2007,
2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) to substantially alter the NKPC relationship
and hence the ination dynamics. This further allows us to analyze both mean-based
and target-based ination gap.
Table 6 summarizes the models implications for the volatility and predictability
of ination gap and the volatility of output growth at the posterior mean of the model
parameters. First and foremost, the estimated model is able to replicate the observed
drop in output growth and ination gap volatility.23We nd a fall of output growth
variability of 37%, and a drop of mean-based and target-based ination gap volatility
of about 70% and 76% respectively. The data we use in estimation implies a fall of
the standard deviation of output growth of about 50% and that of ination of about
60%. Even though the estimated model is slightly o¤-target, our gures are very
similar to those reported in the literature. For instance, Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008) report a fall of output growth variability of about 25% and a drop of ination
variability of about 75%. The numbers in Smets and Wouters (2007) read 35% and
58% respectively.
We also focus on the persistence of ination gap using the R2j statistic proposed
22Leigh (2008) focuses on estimating the implicit target based on both core PCE ination and
GDP/GNP implicit deator ination. Figure 2.3 plots the one labelled as "Estimate of GDP/GNP
deator target (real-time forecasts)" (see Figure 5, page 2028 in the published paper).
23We compute the population standard deviation of the variables by numerically solving the
Lyapunov equation associated with the state-space representation of the model.
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by Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010).24 To measure persistence at a given date t,
these authors propose to calculate the fraction of the total variation in ination gap
that is due to shocks inherited from the past relative to those that will occur in the
future. They suggest that this is equivalent to one minus the fraction of the total
variation due to future shocks. Since future shocks account for the forecast error,
they express this as one minus the ratio of the conditional variance to the uncon-
ditional variance where j denotes the forecast horizon. Table 6 reports R2j statistic
for ination gap predictability for forecast horizons of one, four and eight quarters
following Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010). However, since we allow for positive
steady state trend ination, we consider both mean-based and target-based ina-
tion gap. Some interesting results arise. Similar to the ndings reported in Cogley,
Primiceri and Sargent (2010), there has been a marked decline in the persistence
of time-varying target-based gap at all three horizons. However, it is remarkably
muted for mean-based ination gap. This shows that the persistence of these two
series is considerably di¤erent, a nding that is in line with the autocorrelation of
the two series based on pre and post-Volcker data reported in Ascari and Sbordone
(2014).25Moreover, our nding is also in line with Benati (2008) who fails to detect
a change in raw ination persistence in the U.S. around the time of the Volcker sta-
bilization. Importantly, both mean-based ination gap and raw ination remained
persistent as target ination continued to drift after the Volcker disination. Instead,
it is time-varying target-based ination gap that has become less persistent. Hence,
our results shed further light on the ndings of Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005a),
Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) on the one hand and Benati (2008) on the other.
6.1 Counterfactuals
Next we conduct counterfactual exercises designed to disentangle the role played by
good policyand good luckin explaining the Great Moderation where we closely
follow the counterfactual scenarios studied in Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010)
and Castelnuovo (2010). Following these authors, we divide the experiment into two
broad categories. First, we combine the parameters pertaining to the Taylor rule,
i.e.  ,  x,  y, r, 
, r, , of the post-84 sub-sample with the private sector
parameters of the pre-79 period which is called Policy 2, Private 1. This is designed
to capture the role of better monetary policy in reducing the volatility of ination gap
(both mean-based and target-based) and output growth and the persistence of the
target-based ination gap series. We also inspect the policy parameters in detail to
gain further insights. In the second category, we combine private sector parameters of
the second sub-sample with the policy parameter of the rst. This scenario, labelled
Policy 1, Private 2, is designed to study the contribution of non-policy factors.
24Using this measure of persistence based on short- and medium-term predictability within a sim-
ple New Keynesian model, Benati and Surico (2008) show that a more aggressive poliy stance towards
ination causes a decline in ination predictability. However, they estimate the model for the Great
Moderation period only, thus stopping short of using the methodology of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003, 2004) to allow for indeterminacy and estimate the model during the Great Ination period
as well.
25See their Table 1, page 688.
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Table 7 reports the counterfactual results for the volatility of output growth and
the two ination gap series. We report the standard deviations and the percentage
deviations with respect to the pre-Volcker scenario. First and foremost, we nd that
better monetary policy, both in terms of systematic component and a better anchoring
of ination target, is likely to have played a major role in the decline of ination gap
volatility (Policy 2, Private 1). However, better monetary policy alone cannot explain
the decline in output growth variability, a nding we share with Castelnuovo (2010)
who looks at output gap instead. We nd that the decline in output growth variability
is mainly explained by the reduction in the volatility of technology shocks. Hence,
both good policyand good luckare required to jointly explain the reduction in
output growth and ination gap volatility.
Digging further into better monetary policy, we nd that both stronger response
to ination gap ( ) and better anchored ination objective, i.e. a reduction in
the volatility of target ination shocks (), are key ingredients in the reduction of
ination gap variability. This stands in contrast to Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent
(2010) and Castelnuovo (2010) who both nd that a stronger response to ination
during the Great Moderation period only plays a minor role. Interestingly, we also
nd that the decline in the Feds long-run ination target () plays a negligible role
in the reduction of ination gap volatility. That a reduction in  is negligible for
the reduced variability of target-based ination gap is a-priori expected as  cancels
out when looking at log-deviations of the ination gap, t   t . However, that it
is quantitatively unimportant for variability of mean-based ination gap as well is
much less obvious given the qualitative result in Ascari and Sbordone (2014) that
trend ination a¤ects the volatility of macroeconomic variables.
We also conduct counterfactual exercises as regards the decline in ination gap
persistence using the same R2j statistic. Here we focus on time-varying target-based
ination gap alone as the decline in the persistence of mean-based gap is rather muted.
Table 8 reports our results. The main message from these experiments goes hand in
hand with the counterfactuals related to volatility reduction. In particular, we nd
that better monetary policy, once again in terms of both systematic component and
reduced variability of target ination shocks, are key drivers of the decline in the
ination gap predictability. Moreover, the decline in the Feds long-run ination
target, i.e. , plays a quantitatively negligible role.
7 Further investigation
In contrasting constant vs. time-varying target ination, our analysis so far has relied
on a Generalized New Keynesian model with homogenous labor following Ascari and
Ropele (2009) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014). We nd that time-varying target in-
ation empirically ts better than a model featuring constant target ination and de-
terminacy prevails in both pre-Volcker as well as post-1984 sample periods. However,
Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017) show that a similar model with rm-specic
labor is more susceptible to indeterminacy induced by high trend ination than a
model with homogenous labor. Hence, we conduct further investigation along this
dimension and estimate the model of Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017)
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who employ rm-specic labor following Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017). In
order to establish a valid comparison, we use the exact same set of priors, observ-
ables and sample periods as they do.26However, to achieve identication between the
target ination process and the policy-rate shock, we assume that the latter follows
a transitory i.i.d. process while the former is a highly persistent AR(1) process as
before. Table 9 collects our results for the marginal data densities and the posterior
model probabilities.
In line with Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017), we nd that the pre-
Volcker period is unambiguously characterized by indeterminacy while the post-1982
period is characterized by determinacy under the assumption of a constant target
ination. However, when we allow for time-varying target ination, determinacy
prevails for both the sample periods. When comparing the t of constant vs. time-
varying target, we see that it is comparable for the pre-Volcker period while time-
varying target ts better in the post-1982 period. Given that rm-specic labor
makes the model more prone to indeterminacy due to higher trend ination, this set
of results somewhat mitigates, yet does not completely overturn, our ndings. The
hypothesis that the Fed might have pursued a time-varying ination target and as
a consequence determinacy might have prevailed even in the pre-Volcker period is a
possibility that cannot be empirically ruled out.
8 Conclusion
This paper compares Generalized New Keynesian monetary DSGE models under
constant vs. time-varying ination target pursued by the Fed. While allowing for
indeterminacy, we assess the empirical t of these two di¤erent specications for the
period 1966 : I   1979 : II and 1984 : I   2008 : II. Several notable ndings
arise. First, when considering the model with constant ination target, we nd that
indeterminacy cannot be ruled out in the pre-Volcker period while there is a switch
to determinacy after Volcker disination. However, we nd that determinacy unam-
biguously prevails in both the sample periods when we model the Fed as following
a time-varying ination target. Interestingly, the data support the model with time
variation in the Feds ination objective as empirically superior with respect to the
standard constant target model. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst
one to test for indeterminacy using a fullinformation structural approach while com-
paring the t of constant vs. time-varying target. The nding that even pre-Volcker
could possibly be characterized by determinacy is a novel result. Furthermore, coun-
terfactual simulations suggest that both good policyand good luckare required to
explain the Great Moderation. We nd that better monetary policy, both in terms
of a more active response to ination gap and a more anchored ination target, has
resulted in the decline of ination gap volatility and predictability. In contrast, tech-
nology shocks are likely to have played a key role in the reduction of output growth
26The pre-1979 period in Hirose, Kurozumi and Van Zandwaghe (2017) is the same as ours, i.e.
1966:I - 1979:II while for the second sub-sample they use a slightly di¤erent period ranging from
1982:IV - 2008:IV. The choice of the second sub-sample is innocuous for our ndings.
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volatility.
We chose to make these arguments by assuming that trend ination is positive but
constant while the Fed pursues a time-varying ination target. This choice enables us
to keep the analysis simple yet related to existing research. However, one could depart
instead by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a steady state charac-
terized by drifting trend ination which would result in a New Keynesian Phillips
curve with drifting coe¢ cients. Monetary DSGE models with time-varying coe¢ -
cients and stochastic volatilities have been estimated by Fernandez-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramiresz (2007a,b) and Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana and Rubio-
Ramirez (2010). We wish to pursue these lines of research in the future.
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Table 1 - Prior distributions for parameters.
Parameter Range Density Prior Mean St. Dev
  Gamma 1.10 0.50
 x Gamma 0.125 0.10
 y Gamma 0.125 0.10
r Beta 0.50 0.20
 Normal 0.976 0.50
r Gamma 1.612 0.25
g Normal 0.50 0.10
h Beta 0.50 0.10
 Beta 0.50 0.10
d Beta 0.70 0.10
g Beta 0.40 0.10
r Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
d Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
g Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
 Uniform 0.075 0.0433
 Inv-Gamma 0.50 0.20
Mr; Normal 0.00 1.00
Md; Normal 0.00 1.00
Mg; Normal 0.00 1.00
M; Normal 0.00 1.00
Notes: The inverse gamma priors are of the form
p (j; &)1  1e  &
2
22 where where  = 4 and & = 0:38.
The prior probability of determinacy is 0:48:
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Table 2: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy
Log-data density Probability
Sample Target ination Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
1966:I-1979:II Constant -126.22 -126.25 0.51 0.49
Time-varying -122.99 -128.58 1 0
1984:I-2008:II Constant -29.75 -41.76 1 0
Time-varying -27.52 -53.29 1 0
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Table 3: Posterior estimates for DSGE parameters under time-varying target
Pre-1979 period Post-1984 period
Parameter Mean [5th pct, 95th pct] Mean [5th pct, 95th pct]
  2:01 [1:32; 2:60] 3:94 [3:03; 4:88]
 x 0:12 [0:02; 0:29] 0:13 [0:02; 0:34]
 y 0:15 [0:03; 0:33] 0:45 [0:14; 0:76]
r 0:51 [0:24; 0:72] 0:75 [0:65; 0:81]
 1:31 [0:93; 1:67] 0:85 [0:51; 1:22]
r 1:57 [1:22; 1:90] 1:55 [1:24; 1:90]
g 0:54 [0:37; 0:68] 0:51 [0:40; 0:62]
h 0:42 [0:31; 0:55] 0:42 [0:32; 0:53]
 0:53 [0:33; 0:74] 0:53 [0:39; 0:65]
d 0:74 [0:59; 0:85] 0:92 [0:88; 0:95]
g 0:27 [0:14; 0:49] 0:18 [0:12; 0:27]
r 0:36 [0:25; 0:52] 0:19 [0:15; 0:24]
d 1:19 [0:37; 2:20] 1:84 [1:24; 2:74]
g 1:04 [0:32; 1:73] 0:73 [0:61; 0:89]
 0:08 [0:02; 0:14] 0:04 [0:02; 0:05]
Results based on 10,000 particles from the nal stage in the SMC algorithm.
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Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Pre-1979 Sub-sample
Quarters Ahead Policy Shock Preference Shock Technology Shock Target Ination Shock
Output Growth
1 3.54 2.53 93.92 0.02
4 3.74 2.60 93.41 0.25
8 3.74 2.60 93.40 0.25
20 3.74 2.60 93.40 0.25
40 3.74 2.60 93.40 0.25
1 3.74 2.60 93.40 0.26
Ination Gap (Mean-based)
1 22.72 44.39 0.61 32.28
4 13.25 33.16 1.10 51.69
8 9.24 24.53 0.77 65.47
20 5.08 13.55 0.42 80.95
40 3.10 8.27 0.26 88.37
1 1.13 3.00 0.09 95.78
Ination Gap (Target-based)
1 28.45 55.58 0.76 15.22
4 20.44 52.37 1.70 25.49
8 17.04 45.26 1.42 36.29
20 12.01 32.01 1.00 54.98
40 8.47 22.57 0.70 68.26
1 3.64 9.70 0.30 86.36
Interest Rate
1 24.28 60.68 0.87 14.17
4 8.26 63.00 0.32 28.43
8 5.85 50.99 0.23 42.93
20 3.57 31.46 0.14 64.83
40 2.30 20.30 0.10 77.31
1 0.89 7.81 0.03 91.26
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Table 5: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Post-1984 Sub-sample
Quarters Ahead Policy Shock Preference Shock Technology Shock Target Ination Shock
Output Growth
1 2.14 1.29 96.54 0.02
4 2.25 1.38 96.32 0.06
8 2.25 1.38 96.31 0.06
20 2.25 1.38 96.31 0.06
40 2.25 1.38 96.31 0.06
1 2.25 1.38 96.31 0.06
Ination Gap (Mean-based)
1 35.18 41.25 10.19 13.38
4 27.02 39.62 9.54 23.82
8 22.52 35.99 7.95 33.53
20 16.04 27.49 5.66 50.81
40 11.57 20.03 4.09 64.31
1 5.16 8.93 1.82 84.10
Ination Gap (Target-based)
1 39.18 45.94 11.35 3.53
4 33.87 49.65 11.96 4.52
8 32.00 51.13 11.30 5.57
20 29.82 51.12 10.53 8.52
40 28.34 49.06 10.01 12.60
1 23.56 40.79 8.32 27.33
Interest Rate
1 20.21 74.43 0.03 5.34
4 4.81 87.13 0.28 7.78
8 2.94 86.74 0.17 10.14
20 2.04 80.52 0.12 17.32
40 1.73 70.98 0.10 27.19
1 1.11 45.50 0.07 53.33
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Table 6: Implications of the model for ination gap
volatility and predictability and output growth volatility





Output growth 1966:I-1979:II 0.92 - - -
1984:I-2008:II 0.58 - - -
Percent Change -37 - - -
Mean-based 1966:I-1979:II 1.76 0.96 0.92 0.88
Ination Gap
1984:I-2008:II 0.52 0.87 0.81 0.77
Percent Change -70 -9 -12 -13
Target-based 1966:I-1979:II 0.98 0.89 0.82 0.79
Ination Gap
1984:I-2008:II 0.24 0.47 0.30 0.26
Percent Change -76 -47 -63 -67
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Table 7: Counterfactual standard deviations
Scenarios Output Growth Mean-based ination gap Target-based ination gap
St. Dev Percent Change St. Dev Percent Change St. Dev Percent Change
Policy 2, Private 1 0.90 -2 0.59 -66 0.28 -71
 ,  x,  y, r 0.91 -1 1.16 -34 0.43 -56
  0.91 -1 1.13 -36 0.35 -64
 0.92 0 1.71 -3 0.93 -5
 0.92 0 0.92 -48 0.58 -41
Policy 1, Private 2 0.61 -34 1.77 +1 0.99 +1
g, g 0.63 -32 1.76 0 0.98 0
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Table 8: Counterfactual predictability
Scenarios Target-based ination gap
R21 Percent Change R
2
4 Percent Change R
2
8 Percent Change
Policy 2, Private 1 0.38 -57 0.24 -71 0.23 -71
 ,  x,  y, r 0.57 -36 0.46 -44 0.44 -44
  0.77 -13 0.69 -16 0.66 -16
 0.87 -2 0.80 -2 0.77 -3
 0.71 -20 0.58 -29 0.55 -30
Policy 1, Private 2 0.91 +2 0.84 +2 0.79 0
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Table 9: Determinacy versus Indeterminacy (rm-specic labor)
Log-data density Probability
Sample Target ination Determinacy Indeterminacy Determinacy Indeterminacy
1966:I-1979:II Constant -132.27 -120.86 0 1
Time-varying -120.68 -123.41 0.94 0.06
1984:I-2008:II Constant -47.56 -61.83 1 0
Time-varying -45.96 -70.96 1 0
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Figure 1: Federal Reserves Ination Target
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Figure 2: A comparison of ination target estimates
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